The writer is an FT contributing editor, chief economist at American Compass and writes the Understanding America newsletter
Late in the US presidential election campaign, Democrats discovered a serious problem. Young men, minorities especially, had abandoned the party in droves. An American Compass poll, conducted with YouGov in early October, captured a snapshot: 20 per cent of young non-white men had not yet settled on either Donald Trump or Kamala Harris, and those who had decided were evenly split.
Harris did not know what to say to these defectors. Her coalition was built on an identity politics that presumed an alliance among younger and LGBTQ+ voters, women and people of colour, all sharing the same commitment to a progressive vision of social justice. Somewhat awkwardly, the actual agenda — fighting climate change and forgiving student debt, resisting any restrictions on immigration or abortion — aligned primarily with the interests and priorities of a white, female, college-educated elite. But anyone who looked like a coalition member was expected to vote accordingly.