The writer is an FT contributing editor, a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution, and author of a forthcoming book on globalisation
The first Gulf war in 1991 marked the start of the unipolar era. China and the Soviet Union were stunned by the sophisticated US military campaign and the world brushed off an oil shock to embrace globalisation. The second Gulf war that began in Iraq in 2003 symbolised over-reach. It is tempting to say the third Gulf war marks a moment of disintegration. Yet the dawning new era is not that simple to define. The war shows some of America’s failures but also how asymmetrically powerful it is and how anarchic the planet will be without its sustained commitment to order. Even for adversaries, that is sobering.
The shortcomings are plain to see. A war with unclear objectives lacks bipartisan Congressional support and is unpopular with voters. It has ruptured relations with Nato. If it is sustained, surging oil prices will boost Russia’s revenue by over $80bn annually, more than the Kremlin’s entire 2025 budget deficit. US military resources have been drawn away from Asia, supposedly the priority. Munitions inventories that would be essential in a war with China have been run down, with at least a fifth of Tomahawk missiles and a third of Thaad interceptors used up. Cheap drones blowing up data centres in the UAE and gas plants in Qatar are staggeringly expensive to stop. The war has cost America $9bn a week.