It was a big moment for a Polish foreign minister to declare in 2011 that he was “not so much afraid of German power; it’s German inactivity I’m starting to fear.” Radoslaw Sikorski’s words related to the eurozone crisis, but until days ago they might also have referred to Berlin’s seeming reluctance to impose serious penalties over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Germany’s weekend announcements that it would supply weapons to Kyiv — reversing its refusal to export arms to conflict zones — and sharply increase defence spending have overturned decades-old security and foreign policy doctrines. They are the most dramatic sign yet of how Vladimir Putin’s aggression is reshaping assumptions across Europe.
The German transformation began last week when chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that certification of the Nord Stream 2 Russian gas pipeline was suspended. In quick succession Berlin’s three-way coalition later dropped resistance to suspending some Russian lenders from the Swift message system. It allowed other countries to send some German-made weapons to Ukraine, then announced its own plans to send missiles, armoured vehicles and fuel. Finally, Scholz unveiled a €100bn fund to modernise the German military, and vowed it would raise spending on defence from 1.5 per cent of economic output to the Nato target of 2 per cent.
The chancellor also vowed to modernise fighter jets needed for its Nato nuclear sharing agreement — which involves German planes carrying US weapons to their targets in a conflict. And he promised to speed up efforts to reduce its reliance on Russian oil and gas.