Yet, as with subprime, these structured loans no longer look so smart. Many of the biggest users of these pre-IPO convertibles were in sectors that are now reeling, particularly Asian real estate. Essentially debt with equity upside, they were predicated on initial public offerings at bloated 2007-style multiples, upwards of 30 times projected earnings. Many deals were written at the top of the market when participation was more important than analysis. In the worst cases, term sheets barely covered an A4 sheet of paper and due diligence was often cursory. Now that the IPO exit is effectively shuttered, hedge funds and other investors find themselves loaded up with illiquid paper they have no way of marking to market. Sound familiar?
然而，与次贷一样，这些结构性贷款看上去不再那么风光。这些首次公开发行(IPO)前可转换证券(pre-IPO convertibles)的许多最大用户都身处目前陷入困境的行业，特别是亚洲房地产行业。这些证券本质上是具备股票优势的债务，其基础是IPO以2007年那种膨胀的市盈率——超出预期收益30倍——进行。许多交易是在市场见顶时进行的，当时参与要比分析更为重要。在最糟糕的情况下，投资条款清单几乎还不足一页A4纸，尽职调查也往往十分粗略。由于目前IPO出口实际上已然关闭，对冲基金和其他投资者发现，自己手头净是些无法按市值计价、不能变现的票据。听起来有些耳熟？