A few days before the famous Bretton Woods monetary conference in July 1944, John Maynard Keynes, the UK’s lead negotiator, had one of his legendary dust-ups with his American counterpart, Harry Dexter White. It was over the role of the US dollar in the postwar world. White was determined to make the dollar the sole international currency; legally a surrogate for gold itself. Keynes, whose country was effectively bankrupt – meaning it had not nearly enough gold or dollars to settle its international debts – was equally determined to ensure the dollar would have no such special status. The survival of the British empire itself could hinge on Britain’s ability to salvage some measure of international acceptability for the pound sterling or, at the very least, access to an international medium of exchange (which he wanted to call “bancor”) not controlled by the Americans. Britain was a desperate debtor with no cards to play, and Keynes lost that battle.
在1944年7月著名的布雷顿森林(Bretton Woods)货币会议召开前几日，英国首席谈判代表约翰•梅纳德•凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)与美国首席谈判代表哈里•德克斯特•怀特(Harry Dexter White)进行了一场传奇般的争论。争论主题是美元应在战后世界中扮演什么角色。怀特决心让美元成为唯一的国际货币，即黄金的合法替代品。凯恩斯则同样下定决心不让美元攫取到如此特殊的地位。凯恩斯的国家事实上已经破产，即它所拥有的黄金或美元远不够偿清它的外债。大英帝国自身的存亡，可能取决于该国能否在某种程度上挽回国际社会对英镑的认可，或者至少推动各方接受不由美国人控制的国际交易媒介（凯恩斯希望称之为“班科”(bancor)）。英国当时已是陷入绝境的债务国、无牌可出，所以凯恩斯输掉了那场争论。