专栏重庆

The threat to the post-Mao consensus

The last emperor of China was Mao Zedong. One of Deng Xiaoping’s most important achievements after Mao’s death was to rid the system of an all-powerful head, the charismatic figure around which the whole system revolved. The Mandate of Heaven perished in 1976, which is why the pre- and post-Maoist political systems have almost nothing in common despite the fact that they were both nominally communist.

Deng, the architect of China’s Reform and Opening, was powerful, to be sure, but less quixotically so than Mao. So wary was he of the cult of personality, he actively discouraged busts or portraits in his likeness. Jiang Zemin, who emerged as Deng’s successor in the early 1990s, had less power still than Deng. The current leader, the colourless and robotic Hu Jintao, is weaker than all of them. The purge of charisma is complete. Or at least it was until Bo Xilai burst on to the scene.

Post-Mao, China has instead built a meritocratic collective leadership that rules by consensus. That consensus is forged within the nine-member standing committee, which stands at the apex of the system, and the 25-member politburo of which Mr Bo is still a member. Beyond that, there is the wider Communist party, the People’s Liberation Army and various branches of the bureaucracy.

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戴维•皮林

戴维•皮林(David Pilling)现为《金融时报》非洲事务主编。此前他是FT亚洲版主编。他的专栏涉及到商业、投资、政治和manbetx20客户端下载 方面的话题。皮林1990年加入FT。他曾经在伦敦、智利、阿根廷工作过。在成为亚洲版主编之前,他担任FT东京分社社长。

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