Mali’s tragedy is the result of a misalignment in the stars. Unusual geopolitical circumstances triggered a shock; a further coincidence prevented a timely response. The repercussions are now being felt in Algeria and beyond.
Until the Libyan revolution culminating in October 2011, Mali was not a fragile state. In June that year, the International Monetary Fund listed 48 such states. Mali was on none of them. By the standards of low-income countries, it was secure. Admittedly, it was neither inclusive nor effective: the Tuareg minority was beyond the pale; patronage and corruption were common. This kind of combination leaves many democracies more prone to political violence than the dictatorships they replaced.
The fall of Libya’s Muammer Gaddafi inflicted an avoidable military threat on the region. Many of the weapons stockpiled in his country were seized by gangs bent on mischief. A parallel served as a warning: the conflicts triggered by arms looted during Albania’s 1997 meltdown. However, there was no international appetite for the ground operation necessary to secure the stockpile. The urgent task, therefore, was to protect neighbouring regimes. In Mali, this meant turning an army starved of equipment and led by the less able children of the elite into a fighting force.