Years of artificially low interest rates have been key both to China’s rapid growth and to its notorious domestic imbalances. The role of financial repression – manipulating the financial system to divert money from savers to producers – in the Chinese growth model is widely recognised. But the improvement in the country’s interest rate structure is not.
As a rule when nominal lending rates are broadly in line with nominal gross domestic product growth rates, the rewards of expansion are efficiently distributed between savers and users of capital. When they are substantially lower, however, as they have been in China for the past 30 years, net lenders – mainly household depositors – in effect pay a hidden subsidy to net borrowers. In China these include state entities, manufacturers, state-owned enterprises and real estate developers.
This subsidy – an astonishing 5-8 per cent of GDP – encourages irresponsible borrowing and forces down household income. This is why its elimination is crucially important both for rebalancing the economy towards greater household consumption and for reducing the amount of wasteful investment.