China wants to be a superpower, or even the global superpower, by the middle of this century. That is the meaning of Xi Jinping’s second “centennial goal”: becoming a “strong, democratic, civilised, harmonious and modern socialist country” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. It won’t be so.
Whether you use the original definition of superpower status — the possession of pre-eminent military power and the ability to project it globally — or whether you broaden it to include economic, political, cultural and intelligence power, and the ability to shape international governance, what matters is the long-term capacity to pay for it all.
The costs China bears today are small compared with those it would need to shoulder — for decades — as a superpower. Its military expenditure falls far short of America’s. Domestically, the costs of repression and stability are said to be even greater than the budget of the People’s Liberation Army. An ageing population of 1.4bn requires a comprehensive social security system. The costs of rectifying the environment are mind-boggling.