The reports of massacres of civilians in Bucha, close to Kyiv, cannot, alas, be a surprise. In response, Emmanuel Macron argued that, “What happened in Bucha demands a new round of sanctions and very clear measures, so we will co-ordinate with our European partners, especially with Germany.” He added that “on oil and coal, we must be able to move forward. We should certainly advance on sanctions . . . We can’t accept this.” But sanctions on Russian oil and coal are insufficient. It is necessary to embargo imports of Russia’s gas, too.
According to the US Energy Information Agency, in 2021, 74 per cent of Russia’s exports of natural gas went to European members of the OECD. That would amount to 5 per cent of Russia’s export earnings. The difference between these exports and those of oil and coal is that it is easier for Russia to shift their destination than it is of gas, whose transport depends on inflexible infrastructure.
Adding gas to the list of embargoed products would therefore increase the pain on Russia. The objections to this idea are that some European countries are particularly dependent on Russian gas and so the costs of cutting imports substantially for them would be huge.