The long-predicted weaponisation of trade has, it seems, finally arrived. The US-China rivalry and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have politicised commerce to an extent not seen since the cold war. It’s not just that governments are increasingly blocking geopolitical rivals’ access to militarily sensitive technology. The big trading powers have also restricted exports of vital materials and tried to prevent adversaries selling their own commodities abroad. But just because governments are keen on export curbs and trade sanctions doesn’t mean they work. Beijing’s imposition of controls on critical minerals, the US-led G7 club of rich countries’ sanctions on Russian oil, Russia’s own attempted coercion of western Europe by cutting off gas supply: all have caused alarm, but none has yet succeeded in crippling its target. Governments cannot muster enough control over global demand to choke off trade, supply chains are agile, sometimes illicitly so, and end users have found alternatives.
早在意料之中的“贸易武器化”似乎终于到来了。美中对抗和俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，使商业的政治化达到了冷战以来从未见过的程度。不仅各国政府越来越多地阻止地缘政治对手获得军事敏感技术，贸易大国还限制关键材料的出口，并试图阻止对手出口他们自己的大宗商品。