The writer is director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme
The war against Iran that began on February 28 is likely to end with all sides claiming military success — but battlefield wins will not automatically lead to political change. Despite the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the conflict’s first day and sustained attacks on Iran’s strategic infrastructure, the regime quickly appointed a successor and continued to mount retaliatory strikes targeting Israel and the more vulnerable Gulf Arab states. Tehran has demonstrated its capacity to continue fighting by relying on a deliberately decentralised military structure designed to ensure retaliation even if leadership is disrupted. It is clear that the regime sees this war as a fight for its survival.
Washington’s objectives are less clear. At different moments, US officials have framed the war as an effort to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities, weaken its military and proxies, or pave the way for regime change led by the people. These are very different goals that point to very different endgames. With no coherent strategy and as the war’s costs grow, a more recognisable outcome is emerging. Iran could come to resemble Iraq after the 1990-91 Gulf war: a country militarily defeated and economically debilitated yet still governed by a reconstituted form of the same regime.