Officially, the state of China/Taiwan relations is best characterised by the economic co-operation framework agreement (ECFA), the trade deal the two sides signed in Chongqing last June. But cross-straits relations are more accurately captured by Taipei’s mischievous decision to hold missile tests, the first by-invitation media event for nine years, just as Hu Jintao began his state visit to Washington.
The goodwill surrounding ECFA may have boosted bilateral trade: in the first 11 months last year China’s cross-strait imports were up 40 per cent year-on-year while its exports were up by 50. The monthly average trade deficit is $6.8bn, a record high. ECFA should also pave the way for Taiwan to do other trade deals with nations otherwise too afraid of Beijing to do so (its current bilateral agreements with impoverished Central American nations, account for less than 1 per cent of its total trade).
But since Chongqing, diplomatic relations have soured. It escaped nobody’s notice that Chinese officials justified belligerence over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands by elevating them to “core national interests” – on a par with Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. After North Korea shelled the South, meanwhile, Taiwan aligned itself unambiguously with Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. The governing Kuomintang’s poor showing in November’s mayoralty elections – it received 5 per cent less of the popular vote than the more vigorously pro-independence DPP – suggests the government will adopt a cooler attitude toward Beijing until next year’s presidential elections.