Everyone loves to bash the European Commission. In normal times, it is portrayed as remote, inefficient and unaccountable. But since the eurozone debt crisis, more serious charges have been made about its understanding of finance and financial markets. The most recent is the International Monetary Fund’s internal review of its own involvement in the first Greek bailout. It blasts the commission’s lack of experience of overseeing countries’ structural adjustment, and of crisis management more generally.
Criticism of the commission has, in fact, defined the commentary on the debt crisis. When there is scrutiny of the IMF, the European Central Bank and the commission – the troika that organised the Greek bailout – the commission is always portrayed in the least favourable light. Despite several policy blunders by the IMF, eurozone members continue to have confidence in its technical competence. Meanwhile, the ECB’s programme of outright monetary transactions , or bond-buying, is credited with reducing the risk of a eurozone break-up.
The commission, for its part, has not done everything right but it has done a far better job than its critics claim. This is especially true given Europe’s complex political structure and the constraints that member states impose on the commission as a result.